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RECIPIENTS OF REBATES AUTHORIZED UNDER THE
ILLINOIS SPECIAL ASSESSMENT STATUTES
HERBERT R. STOFFELS*
INCE

THE heyday of land-subdivision developments in the boom

years of the late 20's, Municipal Attorneys have been plagued
with a novel and virtually unsolvable problem involving Special
Assessments. The fact that many thousands of dollars are at stake has
magnified the gravity of the legal problem handed to the City's Corporation Counsel for solution.
It is the purpose of this paper to suggest as a solution an answer
which has been with us these past thirty years but which has not
been utilized, absent a positive judicial declaration. As will be shown
herein, the Illinois State Legislature, in 1963, has, by amendment,
attacked the problem as to Special Assessments spread after 1963. It
is elementary, however, that legislation does not operate retroactively.
Here, then, is a typical case as presented to the City Attorney. In
1956, the City of Park Ridge spread a Special Assessment for the
widening and improving of a designated street. A judgment was
entered in the County Court of Cook County assessing property according to law, including specified premises fronting on that street.
At that time, the grantor owned these premises, and on December 13,
1957, he paid the full assessment and interest. Following this payment
and the completion of the street improvement, the grantor sold the
premises. By October 1, 1964, the City of Park Ridge had paid all
construction bills and also all vouchers and special assessment bonds
issued under the above Special Assessment. There remained on hand
a substantial sum to be rebated to those entitled thereto, less 5% for
expenses of making a rebate. Accordingly, on October 20, 1964, the
City Council adopted an ordinance declaring that the surplus existed,
and ordaining that the net surplus be "paid to the owners of record
of each ... parcel as of this date being the time of the declarationof
* MR. STOFFELS is the PresidingJudge of the Third Municipal District of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, having held this position since January 1, 1964. He received
his J.D. from Northwestern University in 1927, and has been a member of the Illinois
Bar since that year. From 1927 to 1963, he was in the general practice of law, and served
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the rebate." When grantor paid the assessment in 1957, the Illinois
statute provided that the rebate be paid "to the persons entitled thereto."' After the grantee had bought the property, the statute was
amended to read that "such rebate shall be paid to the owner of
record of each such . . . parcel at the time of the declaration of the
rebate."'2 To whom shall the municipality refund the proportionate
share of the rebate?
The surplus to be rebated are those funds collected through special
assessment which remain in the hands of the municipality after it has
made final settlement with the contractor and has paid all outstanding
charges and bonds. Simply stated, where the total amounts assessed
against all the lots is later found to be more than enough to complete the project, a surplus will remain which must be distributed in
some manner.
Originally, the law provided that the person making the overpayment was to receive notice therof, and upon proper proofs was to
be paid that amount to which he was entitled.3 This, however, was
amended in a later session of the legislature to read that a proportionate rebate was to be declared upon each lot, block, tract or
parcel of land assessed, and that rebates were to be paid "to the
persons entitled thereto."4 The last phrase of that statute left municipal authorities in a quandry. Aware of the fact that they held
surplus funds as trustees, 5 they dared not gamble by guessing who
was legally "entitled thereto." In the absence of a clear statutory directive, many refrained from making any distribution.
The words, "shall be repaid to the persons entitled thereto," remained in the statute until August, 1963, when the following words
were substituted therefor: "Such rebate shall be paid to the owner
of record of each lot, block, tract, or parcel at the time of the declaration of the rebate. .".."I'The questions raised by this change are the
following. Did the legislature intend by this amendment to do no
more than clarify what it had meant when it used the phrase, "the
person entitled thereto," or was this new wording a complete reversal
of the former policy of rebating?
I ILL. REV.

STAT.

2 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 24, S9-3-33 (1957).
ch. 24, S9-2-138 (1963).

I11. Laws S93, at 133 (1897).
4 Ibid.

5Flanagan v. Chicago, 311 Ill. App. 135, 35 N.E. 2d 545 (1941).
6 Supra note 2.
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There is no Illinois case in which this question was considered.
There are cases in which comments seem to touch on the problem,
but when scrutinized, they afford little help. Since the precise question was not involved, precise definition was not achieved. Thus, in
Chicago v. McCormick,7 a suit in assumpsit to recover a rebate, the
court said, "the remainder ($4,766.33) belonged to the property
owners who paid it in. The city held the ratable proportion of this
remainder 'sdue on appellee's lot as money had and received by it for
their use."

It should be noted that the plaintiff, McCormick, who successfully
sought recovery, was the owner at the time the lot was assessed and
continued to be the owner to and including the time when suit was
filed. Significant, also, is the use of the two phrases, "property owners
who paid it in" and "due on appellee's lot." The implication appears
inescapable that it is the lot which is to be considered in determining
to whom the rebate is to be given.
In the case of Flanaganv. Chicago,' involving the special assessment
to improve Wacker Drive, there appears the following:
There can be no question but that the surplus in the hands of the city of the
assessments collected over and above the cost of completion of the project constituted a trust fund of which the assessees are the beneficiaries and the city the
trustee. It has been repeatedly held that the proceeds of special assessments are
trust funds for the payment of bonds issued for the cost of improvements. It
necessarily follows that special assessment collections over and above the cost of

the completion of the improvement must be trust funds held by the city as
trustees for the benefit of the assessees.10

In Fort Dearborn v. Chicago," the court dealt primarily with the
right of the municipality which contributed to the cost of the improvement through a public benefit payment, to share in the rebate.
As in most of the cases, the court used language which might be
interpreted as bearing on rights to the surplus. It said, "the general
public and the private property owners should share in the rebate
according to the same ratio that controlled the apportionment of the
cost of the improvement between them."12 The court, considering the
7 124 Ill. App. 639 (1906).

8

1d. at 640.
9 Supra note 5.
1Old. at 155, 35 N.E. 2d at 553 (emphasis added), citing with approval, Conway

v. Chicago, 237 I11.128, 86 N.E. 619 (1908); Rothschild v. Calumet Park, 350 I11.330,
183 N.E.337 (1932).
11318 I11.App. 139, 47 N.E. 2d 561 (1943).
12

Id. at 148, 47 N.E. 2d at 565.
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apportionment of the cost of the improvements,'8 stated that assessment was to be in proportion to the benefits, with no one "assessed
a greater amount than benefited.' '1 4 The court further substantiated
its holding that the individual paying the assessment was entitled to
the rebate by stating that the law as to joint ventures in public improvements 5 clearly provided that "the excess shall be refunded
'ratably to those against whom the assessment was made.' "16
In the more recent case of Waukegan v. Drobnick,7 the court held
that the surplus is to be rebated to "such owners", describing them
as "owners of property which has been assessed."' 8
A review of the statute as originally written, and as it is now
amended, discloses clearly that the assessment is levied against property and not against persons. A special assessment is a peculiar breed
of municipal operation not existing at common law, devised by statute
solely for the purpose of improving property. We do not do violence to the concept on which the Special Assessment is founded by
referring to its lien as one running with the land or by stating that
the special assessment operates in rem and not in personam. Although
the courts have not deviated from that concept, their opinions have
nevertheless created confusion by the use of language such as "the
assessee."' The fact remains that no person in a special assessment
proceeding is assessed. On the contrary, a lien is placed against land
owned by someone who may elect to pay, or not to pay, the amount
of the assessment in order to relieve the property from the lien. That
person is not compelled to make such payment and is not the target
of the assessment. To refer to him as an assessee departs from the
concept of special assessment. This principle is supported by a leading authority ° on assessments, who states:
In the absence of a statute it would seem clear, upon principle that the owner
cannot be made personally liable for the assessment and that a statute imposing
a personal liability in addition to an assessment upon the land should be held unconstitutional. Where a personal liability is recognized there is anomaly. A tax
is imposed on the theory of a pecuniary benefit to the lot and if not paid the
property may be sold. 21
13 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 24,

§ 84-39 (1941).

14 Supra note 11 at 145, 47 N.E. 2d at 563.

181 d. at 585, 202 N.E. 2d at 521.

15ILL.

19 See supra note 5.

REV. STAT.

ch. 24, 84-59 (1965).

16 Supra note 11 at 145, 47 N.E. 2d

at 563.

17 31 Ill.
2d 580, 202 N.E. 2d 519 (1964).

20

MASON, SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS (1898).

21 Id. at 24.
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It has been suggested that when a special assessment is spread, the
law gives the municipality a limited right beyond which it may not
go; that is, that it may not assess a greater amount against a parcel
than that parcel is benefited. The argument is then presented that any
excess over the actual benefit 22 is a void tax. Finally, it is suggested
that the void tax is returnable to the person who paid it. That argument, however, proceeds on a false premise. By statute, the lien is
created against the property immediately upon the confirmation of
the Assessment Roll. Be the amount assessed by that roll either too
large or too small, the lien is just as effective in its inception in respect of the amount later determined to be a surplus as it is in respect
of the amount actually expended in making the improvement. It is,
therefore, improper to say that the excess levy against the property is
illegal. An improvement cannot be commenced until funds are assured for the payment of that improvement. At the time of the commencement of any building project, it is practically impossible to be
23
assured of the ultimate cost. As was stated in Chicago v. Noonan,
"the best estimate that can be made will generally, if not universally,
prove too low or too high. ' 24 If the assessment is too high, the Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of Winnetka v. Taylor," has stated,
the estimate can be reduced by refunding the excess ratably to those against
whom the assessment is made ...The theory of the [local improvement] act is
to charge the cost of the assessment to the property that is benefitted by the im-

provement.

.... 26

Significant, again, is the confusion caused by use of the words in
the statute as well as in this decision. The last sentence of the above
quotation discloses that the assessment is a charge against the property.
The next-to-the-last sentence uses the words, "against whom the assessment is made." It becomes obvious that the assessment is not made
against any person. Rather, it is made against the property. In both
over-estimates and under-estimates, it is the property, and not the
owner, which is the object upon which the law operates.
This principle is further demonstrated by the portions of the
statute which provide that if the assessment is not paid and a surplus
develops, that surplus is first credited to the unpaid portion of the
A surplus is considered such an excess.
23210 111.18, 71 N.E.32 (1904).
24 1d. at 23, 71 N.E.at 34.
22

25 301 I. 147, 133 N.E.2d 653 (1921).
26

1d.

at 154-55, 133 N.E.2d at 656-57.
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tax, thereby reducing the special assessment lien against the property,
and this is true irrespective of who happens to be the owner at the
moment.
Throughout the statute, there appears the intent of the legislature
to operate on property and not on persons. This is clearly demonstrated by the language of the section dealing with apportionment of
the assessments which provides that the official
shall apportion and assess the amount so found to be of benefit to the property
upon the several lots, blocks, tracts and parcels of land, in the proportion in
which they will be severally benefited by the improvement. No lot, block, tract,
of land shall be assessed a greater amount than it will be actually beneor parcel
27
fited.

That the special assessment procedure does not work in personam is
also seen in the section describing the assessment roll as containing a
list of all the lots, blocks, tracts and parcels of land assessed for the
proposed improvement, the amount assessed against each, and the
name and address of the person who paid the General Tax in the
last preceding calendar year in which taxes were paid.2 1 Parenthetically, it should be noted that in many cases, a present owner may
not be legally notified by way of a summons because a former owner
who paid the last General Tax would receive an in rem notification.
This principle is supported by Mason, who states,
[i]n abating the assessment, the surplus must be distributed pro rata among all
the lots where the assessment was reduced .... The issue of benefit and pro rata
share of the cost must be settled in the confirmation proceeding29and the surplus
must be distributed according to the judgment of confirmation.

It should therefore seem that in the interests of consistency, the
statute should continue to operate on property and not on persons,
and that the rebate in the hypothetical case presented above should follow the property and be payable upon proper proof to the property
owner and not a payor.
Nor does this suggested procedure burden municipal procedures.
The problem in the past has resulted from inability to locate the
former owner or other interested person who may have relieved
the property of the lien by payment of the assessment, and the inability of such reputed payor to prove such payment. As a practical
fact, the "redemption" from the lien may have been made by a mort27 ILL.

REv. SrAT. ch. 24, § 9-2-45 (1965).

28 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch.

24,

S 9-2-47

(1965).

29 Supra

note 20.

ILLINOIS SPECIAL ASSESSMENT STATUTES

gage man whose security was impaired by virtue of the prior lien
created through the special assessment. Experience has indicated that
in most of these rebate procedures, there existed an inability on the
part of a payor to prove his right to a refund, and this problem has
been compounded by the passage of time, deaths and inheritances.
On the other hand, it is a fact that all property, at any given moment,
has an owner. The present owner may not have directly paid the
special assessment on which a rebate now has accrued, but it is equally
true that in buying the property he bought it "as is" in respect of
mechanic's liens, special assessment liens, judgment and mortgage
liens, and it seems certain that in establishing the price, all improvements and their costs and values were taken into account both by
the seller, who paid for the improvements, including special assessments, and by the buyer, who verified the presence of the improvements and was accordingly, willing to pay a higher asking price.
As previously indicated, municipalities have not had the benefit of
any judicial guidance. Some of them have considered the rebate as
refundable to the person who presents a receipt evidencing payment
of the initial assessment by that person. It is suggested that the 1963
amendment 0 was adopted as a clarification or restatement of the law
as it heretofore existed, and that the statutory phrase, "the person
entitled thereto" was in fact, and in legislative intent, the owner of
the property at the time of the municipal determination of the existence of a surplus, rather than the payor of the initial assessment.
The courts of other states have touched on this problem. In Moffatt v. Salem,"1 and in Neer v. Salem, 32 the court held that the grantee,
and not the grantor, was entitled to the refund. It must be recognized that the statute of Oregon differed materially from that of
Illinois, but it should be noted that the underlying principle of an
operation in rem, or a concept of a right running with the land, has
prevailed elsewhere.
It will occur to the lawyer engaged in handling real estate transactions that any doubt as to the proper person to receive the rebate
or surplus may be resolved by contract entered into at the time of
the closing of the real estate sale. Neither the standard printed form
of "Contract for the Sale of Real Estate," nor a "letter of opinion"
30

Supra note 2.

3181 Ore. 686,160 Pac. 1152 (1916).

32

77 Ore. 42, 149 Pac. 476 (1915).
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issued by a Title Company, nor a Torrens Certificate, make any
provision for rebates or surpluses, and not the slightest suggestion is
presented that there may be a rebate payable at some future date
or even at the moment of the conveyance. Obviously, the conveyancer
could provide the seller or the buyer, as the case may be, is entitled
to special assessment rebates, if any are or become due. Unfortunately,
if this practice has prevailed in the past, it has been in only rare and
isolated instances. Most practitioners are not put on their guard,
there being no showing in current title papers that there ever was a
special assessment spread and paid for. Even in the practice involving
the examination of abstracts of title, there would be no indication
that a surplus of Special Assessment Funds had been collected and
was available for distribution. Perhaps the cautious practitioner will
hereafter insert an appropriate clause in the real estate sales contract,
thereby protecting his client against the remote possibility that the
1963 amendment 33 may be declared unconstitutional and ineffective.
Finally, we must be aware of the fact that amendments in the
nature of the 1963 amendment occur in a most sensitive area and may
well be the subject of an attack in respect of their constitutionality.
The prudent City Attorney will continue to exercise caution, it is
believed, and will refrain from advising his municipal authorities to
pay out the thousands of dollars presently held in a trust account
until a court of last resort has expressed itself affirmatively, and has
declared the rights of the parties in and to such surplus funds.
33

Supra note 2.

